Unless you follow Division II football, you probably aren’t familiar with the name Bob Stitt. He’s the head coach at the Colorado School of Mines, and here is what Bruce Feldman wrote about him in the summer of 2011 in connection with the One-Back Clinic, an annual meeting of a few of the sharpest minds in college football:

Stitt is the 45-year-old head coach at Colorado School of Mines, a Division II school just down the road from the Coors facility in Golden, Co. Stitt is a regular to the one-back clinic and has become pals with [Dana] Holgorsen and the rest of the core crowd. His teams win big despite dealing with high academic requirements… Stitt’s topic is the pistol offense and back-shoulder throws. As you’ll find out, Stitt is a huge believer in the back-shoulder throw. He talks about it the way Jared talks about Subway. “If this stuff works with our guys, it’ll probably work with the guys you have,” he says. “We’re an engineering school, and we only have one major, engineering. Our average ACT score in math is 29.” That line draws the biggest “Oooh!” of the day. . . .

The tricky part of Stitt’s tact — as is the case with many of the things discussed here — is that it’s hard to say just how well these things could be replicated someplace else. “I love coming to this because it reinforces a lot of what we do, ” one coach says. “Sometimes you might get one or two things you can try out from a technique or a practice point.” It’s also pretty good for networking because you never know what position might open a few months from now.

That was only a year and a half ago, but Stitt’s fame has grown considerably since then. He’s become famous in some circles for the Fly Sweep, a play brought to the national state when Holgorsen repeatedly used the Fly Sweep in the Orange Bowl eleven months ago. So what is the Fly Sweep?

On most plays, West Virginia has Geno Smith in shotgun in a fairly standard shotgun spread look. On the Fly Sweep, the Mountaineers would motion a wide receiver/running back, usually Tavon Austin, before the snap, and have him accelerate as he approached the quarterback. When well-executed, the snap would arrive in Smith’s hands for just a fraction of a second before he would pitch the ball forward to Austin, who would be arriving between the center and the quarterback just a second after the ball was snapped. Already in motion and with the ball in his hands, Austin would then be able to use his considerable speed and quickness to get in space and rack up yards against an unprepared defense.

Well, in the Orange Bowl, it was executed perfectly. For four touchdowns. Take a look:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Gu62DFo9-w

One of the benefits of the play is that it is low risk: if the quarterback/sweep exchange is mishandled, it’s simply an incomplete pass because the quarterback is technically throwing the ball forwards. So why the post today? Well, last week, the Stitt Sweep (my post, I get to pick the name) entered the NFL. I’m not sure if Jay Gruden picked up the play from his time in the Arena Football League or the World Football League — or maybe from just watching last year’s Orange Bowl — but there’s no doubt where the inspiration came from the Bengals first touchdown of the game against the Cowboys. You can see Andy Dalton’s touchdown “pass” to Andrew Hawkins at the 40-second mark of this video.

Twice in close games in the last month, an NFL team has arrived at a three-way junction with seemingly no desirable path. In each case, the team faced a 4th and 7 from so-called ‘no man’s land.’

On November 25th, trailing the Atlanta Falcons 24-23, the Buccaneers had the ball on 4th and 7 from the Atlanta 38-yard line with just over three minutes remaining. Greg Schiano had all his timeouts left but faced a very difficult decision.

On Sunday, with 12 minutes remaining and a 12-7 lead, Chan Gailey’s Bills faced a 4th-and-7 from the St. Louis 34-yard-line. It’s worth noting — in part because it was notable to Gailey — that minutes earlier, Buffalo scored a touchdown but Shawn Powell botched the extra point, preventing Buffalo from going up 13-7. I suppose we could dwell on the fact that up 5 with 20 minutes left in the game after scoring a touchdown is an obvious scenario that calls for going for two, but let’s not do that in this post.

In Tampa Bay, Schiano attempted a 56-yard field goal. In Buffalo, with rain but wind at his back, the Bills sent on the field goal unit but then changed their mind and chose to punt, with the botched snap from minutes earlier apparently being a factor in the decision.

Who was right? Who was wrong? If you think this post is just a bunch of words I needed to type to show off a really cool graphic, you’re right. Take a look at this chart Brian Burke made to tell you what to do on 4th down generally:

At the 35-yard-line facing 4th and 7 is not a desirable situation, but Burke does say you should go for it. If you are a few yards closer to the end zone and it’s 4th and 8, then kicking is the advised course of action, while punting is best reserved for more dire circumstances.

What do teams actually do? This year, 15 times a team has faced a 4th-and-7 from between the 34- and the 38-yard lines. Nine times the team chose to kick the field goal, with teams hitting on 5 of those 9; Nick Folk missed from 52 but made from 54, Josh Brown hit from 52, Matt Prater from 53, Robbie Gould from 54, and Sebastian Janikowski from 55, while Dan Bailey and Janikowski missed from 54. The 9th example was in Tampa Bay, where Connor Barth missed from 56 yards out.

As you might expect if you have watched an NFL game before, coaches who chose not to kick the field goal did not entirely embrace the idea of going for it. Twice the Bills sent Shawn Powell out to punt (net of 29 and 24 yards), twice a team punted the ball out of the end zone (Pat McAfee, Dave Zastudil), and Andy Lee pinned the Rams on their four-yard-line with a 33-yard punt.

There was one coach who chose to go for it. It was Marvin Lewis, that beacon of wisdom in a cavernous field of conservative coaches. In the first quarter, trailing 3-0 to the Chiefs, first Lewis called a fake punt and when the drive stalled on the Kansas City 36, he chose to go for it. Andy Dalton scrambled for 11 yards, the Bengals would score a touchdown three plays later, and Cincinnati would go on to win the game, 28-6.

So what is the right call in the NFL’s version of the Bermuda triangle? The first answer is “it depends.” All these league average stats and theories have caveats which are easy to ignore in obvious situations. In close situations, like this one, all those caveats apply. Is it windy or raining? Are you in a dome? How good is your quarterback? What’s the score? How much time is left? And on and on.

Here are my thoughts for the two examples in this post.

• Schiano made the wrong call, but probably not for the reason you’re thinking. I’d say Barth had something resembling a 50/50 shot of converting that field goal, but what is the upside if he does? You now have a one-point lead against the Falcons with 3:30 to go and they have the ball. That’s not exactly a desirable scenario. According to Burke, the league average team has a 48% chance of winning if they have 1st and down on their own 22 with 3:30 left and trailing by one point. But this was not a situation involving league average teams. Matt Ryan has led the NFL in 4th quarter comebacks and game-winning drives in two of the last three years. He ranks 10th in ANY/A and 3rd in completion percentage, which might actually matter when your only real goal is gaining 10 yards every four plays. To make matters worse, despite an incredible run defense, Tampa Bay ranks 32nd in both passing yards allowedand net yards per attempt allowed.
  
  If there were six minutes left, maybe this is a different story, but I think there was too little time left to give up the ball like that. You’ve got Josh Freeman — who ranks 4th in ANY/A — going against a mediocre Falcons pass defense. I’d go for it in that situation, because your best path to victory is to gain 7-10 yards and then bleed the clock before kicking the game-winning field goal. I’ll also add this: to the extent that you want to bank on your opponent’s conservatism, punting is not as bad of an option as you might think. If you can down the punt inside the 10, and feel confident that Atlanta would run it three times, then you’re in pretty good. If successful, you would get the ball back with about 3 minutes left (remember, Tampa Bay had all three timeouts) and basically place yourself in that positive situation the Falcons would have been in if the Bucs hit the field goal, except Tampa would have been about 25 yards closer. Of course, I have no idea how much you can count on your opponent being conservative: that would depend on the opponent.
• While the clock was the most important variable in the Tampa game, it wasn’t a huge factor in Buffalo. The Bills led by 5 points with 12 minutes to go. In this case, the Bills were at the 34, not the 38, which tilts towards the field goal and away from the punt. On the other hand, there were weather issues at play. In a rare twist, Burke’s calculator essentially has all three options as even, with the Bills having a 77-78% win probability regardless of whether they chose to punt, kick, or go for it. The Bills have a slightly below average passing offense and the Rams a slightly above average passing defense, but neither factor is particular strong. This is one of the closest calls I can think of, as I see good arguments for all three options. The Bills punted and pinned the Rams inside the five, so Chan Gailey won’t face too much criticism.
  
  But while extending a lead from 5 to 8 points doesn’t sound like much, it actually has a significant impact. Down by 8, you need to do a bunch of things well and then convert a two-point conversion and then win in overtime, and those two events only happen 25% of the time. Down by 5 you just need to do a bunch of things well. The weather is an important factor here — Rian Lindell said the wind was at his back, which maybe makes the weather a nonfactor even if it was raining, cold, and windy. In field goals from the 33-, 34-, or 35-yard line since 2009, NFL kickers have been successful 62% of the time. Again, the conditions are a huge variable here, but I think I would have trusted my kicker in this case.

Last week, I sat down with Brian Burke and discussed the work he’s done with NFL teams. Aaron Schatz, founder of Football Outsiders, an indispensable resource for fans of advanced football statistics, has been consulting with NFL teams for years. Schatz is also the lead writer, editor, and statistician on the book series Football Outsiders Almanac and writes for ESPN.com and ESPN The Magazine. Below is my interview with Aaron.

Q: Aaron, can you go into specifics on the type of work you do for NFL teams? Do you envision ultimately working for a team?

As far as consulting with teams, I’ve done two different sorts of things. First, I’ve done some in-game decision analysis, some fourth down stuff as well as some analysis on when to accept or decline penalties. Second, I’ve done reports for teams in February that gave analysis of the season with our stats, looking at what issues were likely to statistically regress and what issues really needed to be addressed, along with suggestions for possible free agent signings. Actually, it’s more accurate to say “we’ve done” rather than “I’ve done.” Some consulting I’ve done alone, and sometimes two or three guys on the FO staff work together.

Consulting for teams is great, but as advanced analysis people gradually move into front offices I don’t think I will be one of them. I don’t know about the various other folks who have followed in FO’s footsteps, but my heart has always been with the media, going back to my days running my high school paper, through my time as a radio disc jockey, doing the Lycos 50, and now Football Outsiders. I set out to revolutionize the way people analyzed the NFL, not the way they managed teams. If I end up improving the way people manage teams a little bit too, that’s just extra coolness.

Q: You publish your DVOA rankings every week, one of the most popular football articles on the web. Have you ever gotten flak from a team for them (i.e., how come we’re hiring you, we have a winning record, and you have us 24th!)?

No flak, no. A couple times I’ve had teams that I’ve worked with or that I’m otherwise in contact with ask me why their rating is particularly low in one area. However, unlike a lot of fans, people who work for teams understand that our stats are objective based on a general formula and don’t get tweaked to favor one team over another depending on how we feel each week. I think when people ask me why their team is low in one area, they often ask so that they can improve that area. And when a team hits rock bottom, I mean, they know it. The Jacksonville people don’t need to ask me why the Jaguars are ranked 30th in DVOA, or whatever it is this week. They don’t care as much about their DVOA right now as they do about their DVOA (and record) next year or two years from now. Jim Schwartz has told me he would rather have his defense ranked highly in DVOA than in yards per game. Of course, he’d rather have more wins than either. (In case it’s not clear otherwise, I should point out there are more teams where I’ve got contacts among various coaches and front office people than there are teams that I have actually worked for and received a check from.) [continue reading…]

Lane Kiffin is not a very good coach, and that’s putting it mildly. He’s one of the most hated men in college football and he’s the face of a USC team that has had the worst season of any preseason favorite since at least 1964. With a 7-5 record, no one is defending Lane Kiffin. And given the various ways he mismanaged the clock against Notre Dame, nobody can defend his performance in that game.

But let’s puts everything aside — Kiffin for being Kiffin, the fact that USC had 1st and goal from the Notre Dame 2 with over 5 minutes remaining and then proceeded to waste over 150 seconds of clock — and look at one particular decision. Facing 4th and goal from the Notre Dame 1-yard line, trailing by 9 points with 2:33 left, Kiffin decided to go for it.

This clearly defies conventional wisdom, and when the move failed, it opened him up to even more criticism. But was it the right call? According to Brian Burke, if this had been an NFL game, the correct call would have been to kick the field goal.

That may not surprise traditionalists, but readers of this blog and Advanced NFL Stats may be surprised to find that, according to the 4th Down Calculator, when trailing by 9 with 2:33 remaining, you need an 87% chance of converting to make going for it the correct call. (I will note that if you are trailing by 10, things change dramatically and going for it is the correct play.)

But this was not an NFL game. Burke’s model is based on two assumptions that are relevant here: one, the team has an average number of timeouts remaining, and two, that the clock will stop with 2:00 to go. USC had one timeout left (which is probably below average for this situation) and there is no two-minute warning in college football. So it’s likely that using 2:33 is not the correct number to use the 4th down calculator for college.

If you use 2:33 remaining, you need an 87% chance of converting to make going for it the correct call.

But, according to the same model, if you use 2:03, it drops to 64%.

If you use 1:33, it drops to 13%.

Obviously figuring out which input to use is very important. However, let’s think about it in a different context.

If USC scores a touchdown and does not onside kick (which I don’t think they do), ND gets the ball at roughly the 25-yard line with 2:25 left. On 1st and 10, they run, USC calls timeout, and there is 2:20 left. On second down, Notre Dame runs, 40 seconds tick off, and there is 1:35 left. Rinse, repeat, and Notre Dame punts with 50 seconds left. This means USC gets the ball with roughly 40 seconds left at say, their own 45.

Here college football’s rules benefit the Trojans because the clock stops momentarily on first downs. At this point, it comes down to this:
[continue reading…]

You know the name Pete Gogolak, don’t you? The former Buffalo Bill placekicker is a famous figure in football history for two reasons. First, he played a key role in the merger between the AFL and NFL in the 1960s. ^[1]Gogolak was the first AFL player stolen by an NFL team. In 1965, Bob Timberlake succeeded on just one of his fifteen field goal attempts for the Giants. That prompted a desperate Wellington Mara to … Continue reading He’s also remembered for what he did on the field: Gogolak is widely credited with being the first soccer-style kicker in pro football history.

But Gogolak’s impact wasn’t limited to identifying the optimal technique for kicking a football: he also helped usher in an era of specialists. In the early days of the NFL, there was no room for a specialist as rosters were tiny and players played on offense, defense and special teams. Unlimited free substitution wasn’t permanently instituted until 1950, and as recently as 1963, teams were limited to just 37-man rosters.

Once teams were allowed to roster more players, and a certain unique brand of kicking was proven to be superior, a more specialized NFL emerged. In 1949, nobody would have signed a soccer-style kicker, or any person who could only kick a football. We joke now that kickers aren’t real football players, because back in 1949, a kicker would also need to play tight end or free safety. The idea that 5’11, 182-pound, 42-year-old Jason Hanson could be a contributing member of an NFL team is as noncontroversial in 2012 as it would have been laughable in 1952. It’s not going to take 60 years before an advanced statistical analyst — perhaps the front office version of a kicker — becomes a contributing member of an NFL organization.

This weekend, I sat down with Brian Burke, the founder of Advanced NFL Stats, a fantastic website on football, statistics and game theory. Burke’s win probability calculator has been one of the most exciting innovations in our industry. In Part II of this series, I’ll be interviewing Football Outsiders’ Aaron Schatz. Neither person is a threat to Ron Rivera’s job security anymore than Jason Hanson is a threat to steal Calvin Johnson’s job. Specialization is the way of the world, and hiring someone trained in the art of decision-making isn’t any different than choosing to hire a lawyer or doctor. We can’t expert anyone to be an expert in everything.
[continue reading…]

With 2:36 remaining in overtime, the Jacksonville Jaguars were at the Houston 47-yard line. It was 4th-and-10, following two short incomplete passes that were sandwiched around a run for no gain. Surprisingly, Mike Mularkey kept his offense on the field. The only similar example I can find of such an aggressive move in this situation came in 2009, when Carson Palmer and the Bengals convinced Marvin Lewis to go for it with 1:04 left in overtime, facing 4th and 11 at the Cleveland 41. Suffice it to say, this was something you don’t see everyday.

Despite being an unorthodox decision, most fans approved of the move. I do as well. Against arguably the best team in the league and your division rival, on the road, why not take the gamble? Is 1-8-1 that much better than 1-9, because punting in that situation is clearly playing for the tie. However, I think it’s important to make a clear distinction here, because stats guys are always recommending teams to go for it more frequently on fourth down.

This was *not* one of those cases. The numbers say this was a bad move. That’s exactly why this decision should be characterized as a a gamble. It’s okay to be risky for riskiness’ sake, but it’s important to recognize that that’s the reason. You’re playing for the variance here, not for the expected value. According to Brian Burke, Jacksonville would have needed a 55% chance of converting to make going for it the smart play. Over time, 4th and 10 plays are converted at roughly a 35% rate, and I don’t think that’s going to be higher when it’s Chad Henne against one of the best defenses in the league, regardless of how the rest of the game unfolded.

An incomplete pass, and your win probably decreases to 30% (never mind what happens on a sack or potential interception return). Give Houston the ball at say, their 14 following a punt, and you have a 60% chance of winning (this counts a tie as half a win). If you convert, you have a 76% chance of winning. Assuming a 35% rate, your win probably if you go for it is just 46% compared to 60% if you punt.

So the numbers don’t say going for it was the smart play. This was a gamble in every sense of the word. When statistical analysts argue that teams should go for it more often on 4th and 1, we’re not advocating risky moves; we’re advocating smart ones. This was risk for risk’s sake — which, given the situation, was probably appropriate.

Scott Kacsmar posted an interesting article yesterday, noting that teams are punting or kicking on 4th down in 2012 more frequently than at any other time in the last 20 years. So far in 2012, just 1.27% of all plays are 4th down attempts.

Scott also noted that teams have been less aggressive on 4th and 1. I wanted to tweak some of Scott’s cutoffs and see if the results changed. I look at all 4th-and-1s since 2000, but limited the data to just weeks 1-10 and the first three quarters of the game. This year, teams have gone for it 56 times in these situations, gaining a first down 75% of the time.

The table below shows how often teams punted, kicked a field goal, or went for it on 4th and 1. The fifth column shows the conversion rate when teams did choose to try to get the first down, and the next two columns display the run to pass ratio (scrambles are included as runs). The final two columns show the success rates by run and by pass.

Year	Punt	Field Goal	Go For It	Conv Rt	Run %	Pass %	Run ConRt	Pass ConRt
2012	54.3%	16%	29.8%	75%	76.8%	23.2%	76.7%	69.2%
2011	48.7%	23.3%	28%	61.9%	83.3%	16.7%	60%	71.4%
2010	50%	11.1%	38.9%	68.3%	76.2%	23.8%	72.9%	53.3%
2009	46.8%	10.5%	42.6%	61.7%	76.5%	23.5%	64.5%	52.6%
2008	47.3%	12.1%	40.6%	70.1%	80.6%	19.4%	74.1%	53.8%
2007	45.3%	14.1%	40.6%	69.6%	84.1%	15.9%	72.4%	54.5%
2006	47.2%	18.1%	34.7%	70.1%	74.6%	25.4%	76%	52.9%
2005	49.1%	10.9%	40%	66.7%	84.8%	15.2%	66.1%	70%
2004	52%	12.1%	35.8%	69.4%	83.9%	16.1%	69.2%	70%
2003	47.7%	15.5%	36.8%	73.7%	87.7%	12.3%	74%	71.4%
2002	48.5%	16.8%	34.7%	69%	82.8%	17.2%	75%	40%
2001	52.1%	14.1%	33.7%	69.1%	83.6%	16.4%	73.9%	44.4%
2000	45.5%	21.3%	33.1%	72.9%	81.4%	18.6%	75%	63.6%
Avg	48.8%	15.1%	36.1%	69%	81%	19%	71.5%	57.9%

It is a bit odd to see that teams seem less willing to try to convert on 4th-and-1 in 2012 than they were a decade ago. Why do you think that is?

Nearly five years ago, I came out with my own draft value chart to replace the “Jimmy Johnson” draft chart commonly cited by draftniks. What I did then was assign the career approximate value grade to each slot for each player drafted over a 30-year period, smoothed the data, and came up with a chart that actually represented career production.

The chart was due for an update in any event, but I’m going to make a key change. Using each player’s career AV makes sense on some level, as the drafting team gets the chance to have a player for his entire career. But the real value in the draft –especially now thanks to the new collective bargaining agreement — is the ability to get a player for cheap on his rookie contract, which expires after (at most) five years. The Jets got a great deal with Darrelle Revis early in his career, but now that he’s the highest paid cornerback in the NFL, much of his value (even pre-injury) is gone.

There’s also another consideration. Of the 100 top-ten draft picks between 1998 and 2007, only 48 players ^[1]counting Eli Manning and Philip Rivers as staying with the teams that drafted them were still on the same team entering their sixth season. From the perspective of the head coach, things look even bleaker. In only eleven instances were the head coach and the top-ten pick still on the same team after five years (i.e., in year six): Chris McAlister and Jamal Lewis with Brian Bilick in Baltimore, Donovan McNabb with Andy Reid in Philadelphia, Richard Seymour with Bill Belichick in New England, Julius Peppers and Jordan Gross with John Fox in Carolina, Carson Palmer with Marvin Lewis in Cincinnati, Eli Manning with Tom Coughlin in New York, A.J. Hawk with Mike McCarty in Green Bay, Mario Williams with Gary Kubiak in Houston, and Levi Brown with Ken Whisenhunt in Arizona.

If you’re a head coach — or a general manager — I’m not sure it makes sense to project any more than five years down the line. Therefore, I’m going to construct my draft value chart based on the amount of Approximate Value provided by that player in his first five years after being drafted. ^[2]Note: I am giving the player credit for all of the AV he earned, regardless of whether or not it was accumulated with the team that selected him. Using PFR’s AV as my guide, I graded each player drafted from 1980 to 2007 and counted how much AV they accumulated in each of their first five years. Below is a chart plotting the data along with a smoothed line:

[continue reading…]

Falcons head coach Mike Smith made a couple of interesting decisions in the 4th quarter of Atlanta’s loss to the Saints on Sunday. And by interesting, I mean conservative. The first strategic blunder came when his team scored a touchdown with 13 minutes remaining, to cut the lead to 28-23 pending the point after. Smith’s absurd reasoning doesn’t merit discussion, and according to Bill Barnwell and the footballcommentary folks, Atlanta should have gone for it if they had just a 23% chance of converting.

Jason Lisk highlighted what was likely in Smith’s head: we don’t know who is going to kick the next field goal. Sure, if it’s the Falcons, then you want to go for two, but if it would be New Orleans (the team about to gain possession) then we’re in a 7-point game situation, so the extra point is the conservative right play.

But here’s the easy shorthand: if the downside to missing the two-point conversion is limited to you needing a two-point conversion later to even things up, then going for it is usually the correct call.

What is the advantage to being down 3 vs. being down 4? Well a field goal ties the game, and even if the opponent kicks a field goal, a touchdown will win it for you.

What is the disadvantage to being down 5 vs. being down 4? Well, a field goal is meaningless in either case (or, if it’s not meaningless, one field goal still leaves you one field goal away from taking the lead). The big disadvantage is that if New Orleans scores, the Falcons would have been down 8 as opposed to being down 7. But in coach-speak, being down 8 is one-possession game just like being down 7 is! That’s obviously not true, but in this case, the downside to going for 2 is essentially cut in half, because you get a second bite at the apple.

In other words, 50% of the time that you ‘go for two’ following a touchdown when trailing by 11, you will be down by 3 and glad you were aggressive; 25% of the time you go for 2 you will have some short-term discomfort, but this will be alleviated when you convert the next touchdown (which you need anyway if you don’t go for two). Only 25% of the time will this move blow up in your face. This is exactly the same logic that dictates that a team, down by 14, should go for two after scoring the first touchdown.

Considering Atlanta’s odds of converting the two-point attempt had to be greater than 50/50, considering that’s roughly the league average, Atlanta’s offense is great, and New Orleans’ defense is terrible, that makes going for two the obvious correct call.

Of course, Smith also made an ugly mistake when he kicked a field goal from the Saints’ two-yard-line when trailing by 4 points with nine minutes left. Had he gone for 2 earlier, I could at least understand the logic of kicking the field goal, even if I wouldn’t do it. But down by 4, he passed up a 50/50 chance to take a three-point lead to cut the lead to 1? Even if he missed, the Saints would have been backed up near the own goal, and a three-and-out would have likely put the Falcons a first down or two away from getting that precious field goal.

The Jacksonville Jaguars faced an uphill battle on Sunday: they were 15-point underdogs against the Packers in Lambeau Field. Trailing 14-6 in the final seconds of the first half, Blaine Gabbert threw a one-yard touchdown pass to tackle Guy Whimper. At that point, Mike Mularkey decided to go for two in an attempt to tie the game before the teams went into the locker room. The two-point conversion attempt failed, and Jacksonville ultimately lost, 24-15. So, did Mularkey make the right call?

In a lot of ways, this is similar to the decision Chan Gailey faced against the Titans in week seven. Essentially, Mularkey would need to calculate:

— (A) Jacksonville’s win probability in a 14-12 game
— (B) Jacksonville’s win probability in a 14-13 game; and
— (C) Jacksonville’s win probability in a 14-14 game

If we assume a 50% conversion rate on the 2-point attempt — more on this in a minute — then the question is a simple one. We just need to determine whether the difference between (A) and (B) is greater than or less than the difference between (B) and (C). Green Bay was set to receive the ball at the start of the second half, so according to Brian Burke, the values for (A), (B), and (C) are and 41%, 45%, and 48%.

I also looked at all games since 2000 where the team was set to kick to start the second half and was tied, trailing by 1, or trailing by 2 at halftime. In 275 tie games, the team kicking off to start the second half won 52% of the time. There were 70 instances where the team was trailing by 1, but they won just 39% of the time. And in 32 situations where a team was trailing by 2, the trailing team won 41% of the time. The sample sizes here are not large, and the set is of course biased; teams kicking off at halftime obviously had the ball in the first half, so if they trailed at halftime, that’s a signal that they were the inferior team.

So Burke’s model tells us that it’s a very close call; a small sample of results indicates a strong preference for being in a tie game. We can also look at Football Commentary, which theorizes that a team needs only a 36% chance to convert to make going for 2 the right call. So as you can see, the results are a somewhat over the map here.

My thoughts? It’s very close. It’s similar to the Gailey decision, but the uncertainty is magnified here with 30 minutes remaining instead of fifteen. There are a lot of ways for the game to unfold that make me think the difference between (A) and (B) is pretty close to the difference between (B) and (C). Still, my gut does tell me that — assuming a 50% conversion rate — it probably *is* better to go for two, but it’s certainly not obvious or a slam dunk. If I was a Packers fan, I would have preferred to see the Jaguars kick the extra point.

That said, understanding the resulting win probabilities is just one part of the equation. Let’s look at some of the others.
[continue reading…]

Most criticisms of 4th down calls spring when teams fail to go for it on 4th down and instead punt or kick a field goal. It is much rarer for stat geeks to cry out for a field goal attempt instead of a punt, and for good reason: field goals aren’t that valuable.

One reason for that: a field goal isn’t really worth 3 points; historical data tells us that a field goal is really worth 2.4 points. That’s because the other team gets the ball following a kickoff, on average, at the 26- or 27-yard line, and possession on 1st and 10 there is worth +0.6 points to that team. Therefore, a touchdown is really worth 6.4 points and a field goal worth 2.4 points, making a touchdown 2.67, and not 2.33, times as valuable as a field goal.

(It’s worth noting that, according to Jim Armstrong of Football Oustiders, since the rules changes last year on kickoffs, the average field position following a kickoff was 22.2 last year and 22.0 so far this season. Teams are at +0.4 in that situation, so a touchdown might now be worth 6.6 points and a field goal 2.6 points.)

Oakland Raiders coach Dennis Allen faced an interesting decision in the first quarter of the game against Atlanta last Sunday. On their second drive of the game, Oakland ran Darren McFadden for 8 yards on 3rd and 16 from the Atlanta 48. Facing 4th and 8 from the 40, Allen chose to punt.

In retrospect, it’s easy to criticize the decision. Shane Lechler’s punt went for a touchback, giving Oakland just 20 additional yards of field position, and after one play, the Falcons were already on the Raiders’ 39-yard line. And, of course, the Raiders lost by 3 in a game where Atlanta’s Matt Bryant nailed a 55-yarder to win the game.

But we can’t look at the outcome when analyzing Allen’s decision. What was the right call? We should probably start by acknowledging that, as a technically matter, the numbers say you should go for it. Considering the fact that the Raiders were an underdog, and that Oakland has (compared to the rest of their team) a pretty good passing game, and Atlanta has (compared to the rest of their team) a weak pass defense, going for it becomes an even more attractive option. But let’s put that to the side for now.

What are the odds of Janikowski hitting from 58 yards away? This season, kickers are 9 of 14 from 55+ yards out, although none have been attempted by Janikowski. Normally I would advise against using such a small sample size, but kickers this year seem to be deadlier than ever from long range. On the other hand, Janikowski is just 4/15 on kickers form 57+ yards over the last five and a half years. Even if you remove the 64, 65 and 66 yard attempts he missed, that’s still just a 33% rate. On the other hand, only two of those came in a dome — two misses in the span of two minutes in a game in New Orleans in 2008. My gut tells me that Janikowski is pretty close to even money in this situation in 2012, but I’m not sure how precise we can get.

But what we *can* do is figure out what the minimum percentage likelihood of success he needs to be at to make kicking the field goal the right call. According to Brian Burke, a missed field goal is worth -1.9 points to the Raiders, since the Falcons would get the ball at midfield, while a punt is worth +0.04 points to the punting team (presumably based on the other team getting the ball at their own 13-yard line).

There breakeven point where you should be indifferent between kicking and punting is therefore 45% (0.45 * 2.4 + 0.55 * -1.9 = +0.04). That seems to make it a pretty neutral decision. Given the fact that the Raiders were a heavy underdog, it’s pretty easy to argue that a 45% chance of 2.4 points (and a 55% chance of -1.9 points) is better than a 100% chance of being in a +0.04 situation. Underdogs need to take aggressive tactics, and this would have been an advisable decision. Of course, the more aggressive strategy with the highest reward would have been to go for it, although the presence of Janikowski does seem to argue in favor of kicking.

This wasn’t a particularly easy decision — or, given the context of the game, a particularly important one. Coaches make far worse decisions every Sunday. I do think in that situation, punting was the worst of the three options available for the Raiders.

[Note: I’m scheduled to appear on The Bobby Curran Show on ESPN 1420 at just after 12:30 today. If you’re interested, you can listen here.]

If you weren’t watching the Steelers-Raiders game, you probably didn’t hear about Mike Tomlin’s gutsy call late in the 4th quarter. That’s because it worked.

On 3rd-and-1 with 4:34 remaining in a tie game, Pittsburgh had the ball at their own 29-yard line. The Steelers ran Isaac Redman over the left guard for no gain, leaving them in a precarious position. According to Brian Burke, immediately following Redman’s run, Pittsburgh had just a 34% chance of winning the game. This makes sense, because on average, punts from the 29-yard line end up with the other team gaining possession at their own 33-yard line (net of 38 yards). This conforms with Burke’s win probability model, which states that a team with 1st and 10 at their own 33 with 3:45 remaining has a 66% chance of winning.

That’s just the average, though. What about the specific teams in this case? Pittsburgh has a rookie punter, so we probably shouldn’t assume anything better would happen if they punted. The biggest variable in the Raiders’ favor was the presence of Sebastian Janikowski, an uber kicker who appears capable of connecting from anywhere on the opponent’s side of the field. Since 2010, Janikowski is 12-of-18 from 50-yards or more, including a miss from 65; on average, those 18 kicks were 55-yard attempts. Essentially, if the Raiders got 30 yards after the punt, they would have had a very good chance of winning the game.

Of course, the Steelers defense is generally one of the best in the league, even without Troy Polamalu and James Harrison. The Raiders had scored 3 touchdowns and a field goal on their prior 4 drives, although we shouldn’t let a small sample size persuade us too much. Additionaly, the Steelers would go three-and-out after converting the 4th down, and the Raiders ended up driving down the field and kicking the game-winning field goal, anyway. Again, it’s tempting to consider this when determining the Raiders’ odds of winning following a punt, but that’s the sort of logic I would rally against if the circumstances were different.

My gut tells me the Raiders being at home, having a pretty decent offense, and a super kicker would outweight the fact that generally Pittsburgh has a very good defense. So at a minimum, I’d argue that a Steelers punt gives the Raiders a 66% chance of winning.

If Pittsburgh converted, they’d probably have the ball somewhere between their own 30 and 35-yard lines; ironically, right where the Raiders ended up having the ball. That makes the calculus pretty easy: Pittsburgh would have a 66% chance of winning if they converted. You might argue that their odds would be greater, because of the presence of Ben Roethlisberger and a strong passing attack and considering Oakland’s pass defense is suspect. I’m sure Steelers fans were very confident that they would win the game after converting on 4th-and-1, but taking the conservative approach would say Pittsburgh had “only” a 66-percent chance of winning if they converted.

Now what were the odds of converting? As always, you can trade a larger sample for a more precise one, and determining the appropriate cutoff is tricky. I looked at all plays in the second half or overtime of games where the team had 4th-and-1 on their own side of the field. I also limited this to games where the team was trailing by 3 or fewer, tied, or winning, to make sure that defenses were truly focused. That left 64 examples from ’00 to ’11.

Teams converted 48 of the 64 attempts, or exactly 75% of the time. On average the teams gained 2.8 yards with a median gain of 2 yards. 55 of the 64 times the team ran the ball, with 44 of those being successful (80%). Only 4 of the 9 passes were successful, although the quarterbacks in the misses (Ryan Leaf, Byron Leftwich, Jason Campbell, Gus Frerotte and Alex Smith) leave something to be desired.

If we increase the sample to any 4th-and-1 attempt outside of the opponent’s 30 (so the first 70 yards of the field for the offense), teams converted 67% of the time. Let’s split the difference and give Pittsburgh a 70% chance of converting.

Facing 4th-and-1, Pittsburgh has a 70% chance of getting a 66% chance of winning the game; that means they have a 46% chance of converting the 4th-and-1 and of then winning the game. This ignores the possibility of Pittsburgh missing the 4th-and-1 and still winning the game, which is clearly non-zero. And remember, if they punt, they have only a 34% chance of winning. Even if we force them to automatically lose if they don’t convert, they still are more likely to win the game by going for it. In fact, they only need to convert half of the time on 4th-and-1 to make it a break-even proposition, and that’s still ignoring the possibility of failing and still winning.

What are the odds of that? With just under 4 minutes left, maybe not as bad as you think. If Oakland has the ball at the Steelers’ 29-yard line, they are extremely unlikely to be able to run out the clock. Pittsburgh called its first timeout before the 4th-down decision, meaning the Steelers still would have had 2 timeouts left if they could not gain one yard. Odds are the Raiders play it pretty conservatively and kick a field goal, and the Steelers have 2 minutes to go to kick a field goal to force overtime (or score a touchdown). That’s hardly a hopeless position in which to be.

Based on past history, Oakland would have had an 82% chance — not 100% — of winning if they had the ball at the Pittsburgh 29-yard line with 3:45 left in the game. Oakland’s odds would be higher because of Janikowski, although that would be counterbalanced by Pittsburgh having one of the best quarterbacks in the league in the two minute drill.

Add it all up, and it becomes a pretty obvious call… unless you’re risk averse. If Pittsburgh punts, they have just a 34% chance of winning, maybe even lower because of Janikowski. If Pittsburgh is successful, they are the team with the 66% chance of winning; if they miss, they still have an 18% chance of winning, based on having a small chance of winning in regulation and a decent chance of still going to overtime based on the amount of time remaining. Note that if there was one minute left, Pittsburgh’s odds of winning drop to just 9% if they don’t convert, but with nearly 4 minutes to go, they would not be out of the game if they failed. Considering a 70% success rate on 4th and 1, and they would have a 52% chance (66% x 70% + 18% x 30%) of winning they game if they went for it. In other words, punting it on 4th and 1 would drop Pittsburgh’s odds of winning from 52% to 34%, making this a significant and obvious decision for Tomlin.

To make punting the better decision, you would really need to skew the odds. If you have the utmost faith in your defense, perhaps you think the Raiders having the ball at their own 33-yard line with 3:45 to go doesn’t make them the favorite to win. If you view that as a coin-flip game — a pretty difficult proposition to believe — Pittsburgh would *still* benefit by going for it, since their win probability was 52%.

It also would have been wise to go for it if they were winning by 1 or 2 points… or even 3 points. A larger lead and it gets a little cloudy, but this is not much different than Bill Belichick’s decision against the Colts a few years ago. At the end of the game, especially in today’s high-octane NFL, you don’t want to be in a close game without the ball.

And as you can see, converting the 4th down was one of the biggest swings in the game. Take a look at Brian Burke’s win probability graph:

I said it was an obvious call unless you’re risk averse. As we all know, NFL coaches think conservatives are very liberal. On the surface this wasn’t a unique situation, but when you try to find comparables, you have to limit yourself. Since 2000, I looked at all situations where a team faced 4th-and-1 on their own side of the field, in a game where they were leading by 8 or less (or were tied), and with between 2 and 6 minutes remaining. There were only 20 situations like that, and 18 times the teams punted. The two other times? One came in week 17 for the Steelers in the game where Jamal Lewis crossed the 2000-yard mark and Pittsburgh was trying to close the curtain on a 6-10 season. A year after “4th and 2“, Bill Belichick went at it again against the Chargers. With exactly 2 minutes to go and the ball at the Patriots 49, New England ran it on 4th and 1. They missed, but went to win after Kris Brown could not connect on a 50-yard field goal.

Yeah, yeah, Football Perspective turned 100 today, blah blah blah. I have something on my mind and I need the wisdom of this crowd. Below is a thought experiment.

You are highly incentivized to correctly guess how many interceptions a quarterback threw in a specific game. If you can answer it correctly within the one-tenth of an interception, you win. (You can assume this is the average of 100 games, if you like, but the point being your answers should not be limited to whole numbers.)

I will inform you that the quarterback in question threw exactly 13 incomplete passes (or each of the 100 quarterbacks threw exactly 13 incomplete passes).

Now, before you guess as to the number of interceptions thrown by this quarterback, I could also let you know how many pass attempts the quarterback had. But I don’t have to. Do you want to know how many attempts he threw, or is that information irrelevant?

If it *is* relevant information that you want to know, how does that knowledge affect your answer? If you knew he threw 45 passes, will you now project him to have more interceptions or fewer interceptions? Please vote in the poll below, but I’m just as interested in your comments. So get to commenting!

[poll id=”6″]

An interesting discussion broke out in the comments to Friday’s post, as sn0mm1s pointed out a bizarre result he’d come across. Before the NFL adopted the 2-point conversion option following touchdowns, teams that trailed by 8 points entering the 4th quarter had a lower winning percentage than teams that trailed by 9 points.

My initial assumption was that this observation is tangentially related to a couple of posts Doug and I had at the old PFR blog where we saw that teams that scored 16 points have had a better winning percentage than teams that scored 21 points and about why teams that scored 13 points had fared better than teams with 14 points. In those cases, scoring 13 or 16 points wasn’t causing teams to win (relative to scoring 14 or 21 points) but rather was an effect of game situations. Teams that scored 13 or 16 points were occasionally kicking field goals to take the lead, while teams that scored only touchdowns were doing so because they were trailing big and eschewing field goal attempts.

In this case, the effect is less clear. Let’s start with the facts. From 1970 to 1993, take a look at the success of teams entering the 4th quarter trailing by 7, 8, or 9 points. The fifth and sixth columns there show how many points the teams had scored and allowed just before the start of the 4th quarter, while the last two columns show the final points scored and allowed data.

Just so we’re clear on how that table reads, there were 594 games where a team trailed by 7 entering the final frame, and they won 21.3% of those games (including ties). On average, at the start of the 4th quarter, they had scored 9.3 points and allowed 16.3 points, and, on average, the game ended with them scoring 15.6 points and allowing 22 points.

It shouldn’t be surprising that trailing by 8 entering the 4th quarter is worse than trailing by 7 in any environment, but especially so in one that does not have the two-point option. The surprising part is that 20% of teams won games when trailing by exactly 9 points at the start of the 4th quarter. That’s a particularly high number. It is possible that there is nothing to this effect; this distinction would fail standard significance tests, ^[1]If we include every game in NFL history, the results would only be significant at the p=0.13 level; over the period form ’70 to ’93, it would only be significant at the p=0.25 level. but we also know that we don’t always want to apply such methods. I’ll get into this more, but suffice it to say I do think there is something going on here, even if there is almost certainly not a causal relationship.

A look at two types of scores in each group is instructive. Trailing 14-6 or 21-13 entering the 4th quarter, teams won just 10 of 63 games (16%). On the other hand, when trailing 16-7 or 23-14, teams have pulled off the upset 13 of 52 times (25%).

I’ll note that there are some weird things going on with the data, which does make me wonder if this is due to randomness. For example, 32 of the 52 teams (62%) trailing 16-7 or 23-14 were at home compared to just 26 of 63 teams (41%) trailing 14-6 or 21-13. Overall, teams trailing by 9 points were significantly more likely to be at home (57% of the time) than teams trailing by 8 points (43%). So that’s… odd.

Although that doesn’t tell the full story, ^[2]i.e., this is not an example of Simpson’s Paradox as 9-point teams still did better than 8-point teams regardless of location. In 70 home games, 9-point teams won 15 games, for a 21.4% rate. In 52 road games, 9-point teams won 19.2% of the time (10 games). In 50 home games, teams trailing by 8 when entering the 4th quarter won 20% of the time, but on the road, they won just 7 of 66 such games (10.6%). Road comebacks when trailing by 8 points were extremely rare, while road teams trailing by 9 won nearly twice as often.

I have point spread data from 1978 to 1993, ^[3]Ignoring games played with replacement players in 1987 so let’s re-work the data around that time frame. Not much changes — 50 of the 88 teams (57%) to enter the 4th quarter trailing by 9 were the home team while just 38 out of 86 teams (44%) that trailed by 8 at the start of the final quarter were the hosts. Those 88 teams trailing by 9 points were, on average, 1.1-point underdogs entering the game. Of the 86 teams trailing by 8 points, they entered the game as … 1.2 point underdogs, on average.

I also looked at the scoring logs in the 4th quarter. We have 174 games to look at, with a nearly 50/50 split between 8- and 9-point games. There were 44 games where the trailing team did not score in the 4th quarter. 22 were in 8-point games, 22 were in 9-point games. So nothing there.

On the other hand, that makes the rest of the results more pronounced. This means that in 20 of the 66 games where a team trailing by 9 in the 4th quarter scored, they won, vs. 13 of 68 games when trailing by 8. Can we get any more detail?

Unfortunately, nothing else really interesting comes out of this. The teams trailing by 9 were more likely to kick field goals and the teams winning by 9 were less likely to pass for touchdowns. It is certainly possible that teams leading by 9 became more conservative; it doesn’t make rational sense in an era before the 2-point conversion for teams to treat an 8-point lead differently than a 9-point lead, but it’s possible that coaches did.

At this point, I pretty much ran out of ideas. Except for this: I have play by play logs since 2000. This is obviously during the 2-point conversion era, but maybe something useful would come of it?

From 2000 to 2011, 12 of the 59 teams to enter the 4th quarter trailing by 9 went on to win, or 20.3% of all teams. Over that same span, only 12 of the 85 teams trailing by 8 entering the 4th quarter — or 14% — ultimately won. ^[4]It’s probably more appropriate to note that 9 of the 85 teams went on to force overtime — and all three won. If we counted all OT games as tied, the winning percentage would drop to 12%, … Continue reading

So again we’re seeing significant differences and unexpected results. This makes me think it is likely that something actually is going on here, as a different set of data produced the same results despite it being less likely to have done so because of the two-point option.

On average, the 9-point games were 18.0 to 9.0 after three quarters, while the 8-point games were more high-scoring with an average of 20.2-12.2. Unlike with the prior data set, just 24 of the 59 nine-point games (40.1%) saw the trailing team at home; in addition, 33 of the 85 eight-point games (38.8%) were at home. This is more in line with what you would expect, as home teams are less likely to be trailing late in games. My guess is the numbers in the prior set on home/road splits were just random results.

Here’s another area where the data diverges. On average, the 8-point trailing teams were 2.8-point underdogs, while the 9-point trailing teams were 0.1-point favorites. Thirteen times since 2000 a team was favored to win by at least 7 points but then trailed by 9 entering the 4th quarter; four of those teams still went on to win (30.1%). Similarly, 3 of the 10 teams to trail by 8 after being a touchdown or more favorites went on to win. So in this case, it’s at least possible that truly better teams end up trailing by 9 points rather than 8.

I looked at the numbers through 3 quarters, and well, it wasn’t all that helpful.

Margin	G	PFs4Q	PAs4Q	Line	Yards	Rsh	Pass	RYD	PYD	TO	OPPTO	NY/A	YPC
-8	85	12.2	20.2	2.8	235.8	19.8	26.4	87	148.8	1.2	0.8	5.6	4.4
-9	59	9	18	-0.1	198	18.2	23.6	73.8	124.2	1.5	0.7	5.3	4.1

The teams trailing by 9 points seem to have played worse on offense, gaining significantly fewer yards through 3 quarters, averaging fewer yards per pass and per carry, and scoring 3.2 fewer points. That doesn’t exactly scream “more likely to score more points in the 4th quarter” but perhaps it also plays into the theory that the opponents are letting up.

Generally, teams trailing by 9 points have scored touchdowns, as a 9-point differential comes from the opponent getting 3 more FGs. 16-7, 19-10, 23-10, and so on. On the other hand, trailing by 8 usually happens when you score 2 FGs and your opponent scores 2 touchdowns. So you’re down 14-6, or 17-9, or 21-10.

Maybe this “trailing by 9” thing is random variation. Maybe it’s something I haven’t considered. The best I can come up with right now is that teams up by 9 really are letting the pedal up on the gas. Often times they will have scored on 3 more drives than their opponent, whereas the 8-point games often feature teams that have scored on the same number of drives. In addition, the overall offensive stats are closer in the 8-point game. If just a few teams up by 9 gave up too soon based on how the game unfolded, that would be enough to skew the numbers. But for now, that’s just a guess.

Let’s start with the obvious: your odds of winning when trailing by 15 in the 4th quarter are really, really low. From 1994, the first season the two-point attempt was introduced to the NFL, to 2011, 68 teams have entered the 4th quarter trailing by exactly 15 points. Only one of those teams won.

Over that same period, there have been 81 times when a team scored a 4th-quarter touchdown when trailing by 15 points, cutting the lead to 9 (pending the extra point or two-point conversion). Only 5 of those teams went on to win the game, with the most recent occurrence happening last year when the Dolphins were Tebowed.

So when trailing by 15 in the 4th quarter, even after scoring a touchdown, your odds of winning aren’t very good. But of those 81 teams that scored a fourth-quarter touchdown to cut the lead to 9, only nine of them went for two after the touchdown. While the time remaining could play a part in the decision, the fact is most of the other 72 teams made a strategic error in kicking the extra point when trailing by 9 points.

The last ^[1]Technically, the last team to do this was the 2007 Jets. Trailing by 15 points with 3 seconds left, the Jets threw a touchdown as time expired, and then went for and converted a totally meaningless … Continue reading coach to recognize that going for two is the correct call? College football’s renegade, Steve Spurrier. In college football, the two-point conversion has been around since 1958, and in general, college football coaches are much more comfortable ‘going for 2’ than their NFL counterparts. ^[2]It’s worth noting that the American Football League had the 2-point conversion, and several teams there took advantage of the rule. In a 1965 game against the Oilers, the great Hank Stram … Continue reading

Against the 49ers on Sunday, with 6 minutes left in the final frame, Aaron Rodgers connected with James Jones to cut the lead to 30-21. At that point, attempting a two-point conversion is the obviously correct call, in an attempt to cut the lead to 7. I was disappointed but not surprised that Mike McCarthy decided to go for 1. But what did surprise me was seeing a number of smart people on twitter disagree with me that going for 2 is the right call. So I figured I’d devote a post to explaining why in this situation, it’s a no-brainer to go for two.

The counterargument goes something along the lines of “just take the points, that way it is a one-score game.” Essentially, people are afraid of missing the two-point attempt and trailing by 9 points. But it’s not a one-score game. Trailing by 8 isn’t a one-score game if you are going to fail on your two-point try. And there’s no reason to think your odds of converting a 2-point attempt are higher when trailing by 2 than by 9. Trailing by 8 is a 1.5-possiession game; half the time it is a 1-possession game, and half the time it is a 2-possesion game. To simply put your head in the sand and say “I don’t wanna know!!” may keep hope alive longer but it lowers your odds of winning.

[continue reading…]

Yesterday, I told you about the RSP Writers Project and showed you my roster. As a reminder, here’s the full 53-man team:

QB1	Peyton Manning		LDE1	Shea McClellin
QB2	Colt McCoy		LDE2	Cameron Heyward
QB3	Nate Davis		DT1	Phil Taylor
RB1	Kendall Hunter		DT2	Jared Crick
RB2	Pierre Thomas		DT3	Terrence Cody
RB3	LaMichael James		DT4	Martin Tevaseu
RB4	John Clay		RDE1	Vinny Curry
WR2	Victor Cruz		RDE2	Adam Carriker
WR1	Torrey Smith		SLB1	Leroy Hill
WR3	Anquan Boldin		SLB2	Aaron Maybin
WR4	T.Y. Hilton		MLB1	A.J. Hawk
WR5	Ted Ginn Jr.		MLB2	Nick Roach
WR6	Wallace Wright		MLB3	Greg Jones
TE1	Jimmy Graham		WLB1	Jameel McClain
TE2	Delanie Walker		WLB2	Clark Haggans
TE3	Matthew Mulligan	LCB1	Morris Claiborne
FB1	Charles Clay		LCB2	Kyle Wilson
LT1	Jonathan Martin		SS1	Eric Berry
RT1	Todd Herremans		SS2	James Butler
LT2	Levy Adcock		SS3	James Ihedigbo
RT2	Vlad Ducasse		FS1	Ryan Clark
LG1	Charlie Johnson		FS2	Dwight Lowery
RG1	Chad Rinehart		RCB1	Ike Taylor
LG2	Robert T Griffin	RCB2	Will D. Allen
RG2	Robert Turner			
C1	Max Unger		K1	Ryan Longwell
C2	Kris O'Dowd		P1	Kevin Huber

But the actual player selections are far less interesting than the reasoning behind the players chosen. You can view the full Q&A session I had with Matt Waldman about my roster, but let me explain two of the philosophies that influenced my roster decisions.

1) Offensive lineman when pass blocking are more like defensive players than offensive ones

On pass plays, offensive lineman retreat and block; their goal is to prevent the aggressors from reaching the quarterback. When DeMarcus Ware tries to get by David Diehl to get to Eli Manning, Ware is the aggressor and Diehl the defender. In those situations, offensive lineman are essentially gatekeepers, and the key to an effective gate is more about the strength of the weakest link rather than the strength of strongest one. When I built my offensive line, my goal was to avoid having any obvious weakness on which opposing defensive coordinators could focus. If you have $25 million to spend on your offensive line, the smartest move in my opinion is to evenly distribute that money, and that’s exactly what I did. While none of the starters cost more than $5 million per year, none of them cost less than $4.5 million per year, either. Essentially, the whole really is worth more than the sum of its parts.

2) For the same reason, the value of individual defensive players can be overrated

As a Jets fan, I watched Darrelle Revis have a magnificent season in 2009, shutting down practically every wide receiver and helping the other ten members on defense. He was the primary reason the Jets ranked #1 in nearly every major defensive category that season. Then, in the AFC Championship Game, Peyton Manning torched the rest of the Jets defense, as Pierre Garcon and Austin Collie combined for 18 catches for 274 yards and 2 touchdowns. If there’s a weak spot on your defense, an elite quarterback will find it. Even two great corners can be neutralized if you have poor safety play. So in building a defense, my philosophy was less focused on finding stars on defense, and more on avoiding having any weak links. Star players are great, but I think — especially given the constraints of a salary cap — building a capable pass defense is less about finding players to build around and more about avoiding having to field players whom opposing quarterbacks would be eager target.

You can read my full Q&A here.

Matt Waldman is best known for his annual publication, The Rookie Scouting Portfolio, the most comprehensive evaluation of draft prospects at the skill positions I’ve ever seen. If you’re unfamiliar, you can view all of Matt’s work at his website, MattWaldmanRSP.com. In addition to being a good friend, Waldman and I also work together at Footballguys.com. So when he told me about his new idea — The RSP Writers Project — I instantly signed up. And in addition to getting some of the best football writers in the internet community to compete, Waldman has also opened his project to anyone who wants to participate.

How does it work? We were asked to build a 53-man roster as if we were constructing our own NFL team. Each player has been assigned a salary and each owner is given a salary cap of $150 million. In addition to picking our players, we were asked to explain the logic behind makeup of our team, along with the schemes and the plays that we would use. You can download the instructions and the Q&A and submit your own team.

I went extremely heavy on offense (more on that tomorrow), spending $93.5 million of my salary on that side of the ball. You can view my full roster here, which lists the salary values and my short explanations for why I chose each player. But here’s a quick look at who I selected:

QB1	Peyton Manning		LDE1	Shea McClellin
QB2	Colt McCoy		LDE2	Cameron Heyward
QB3	Nate Davis		DT1	Phil Taylor
RB1	Kendall Hunter		DT2	Jared Crick
RB2	Pierre Thomas		DT3	Terrence Cody
RB3	LaMichael James		DT4	Martin Tevaseu
RB4	John Clay		RDE1	Vinny Curry
WR2	Victor Cruz		RDE2	Adam Carriker
WR1	Torrey Smith		SLB1	Leroy Hill
WR3	Anquan Boldin		SLB2	Aaron Maybin
WR4	T.Y. Hilton		MLB1	A.J. Hawk
WR5	Ted Ginn Jr.		MLB2	Nick Roach
WR6	Wallace Wright		MLB3	Greg Jones
TE1	Jimmy Graham		WLB1	Jameel McClain
TE2	Delanie Walker		WLB2	Clark Haggans
TE3	Matthew Mulligan	LCB1	Morris Claiborne
FB1	Charles Clay		LCB2	Kyle Wilson
LT1	Jonathan Martin		SS1	Eric Berry
RT1	Todd Herremans		SS2	James Butler
LT2	Levy Adcock		SS3	James Ihedigbo
RT2	Vlad Ducasse		FS1	Ryan Clark
LG1	Charlie Johnson		FS2	Dwight Lowery
RG1	Chad Rinehart		RCB1	Ike Taylor
LG2	Robert T Griffin	RCB2	Will D. Allen
RG2	Robert Turner			
C1	Max Unger		K1	Ryan Longwell
C2	Kris O'Dowd		P1	Kevin Huber

Let me know what you think, and consider submitting your own team or view other rosters here. Tomorrow, I’ll add my comments on why I chose the players I did.