October 5th, 1924 was not the most exciting day in pro football history. The Cardinals defeated the Packers 3-0 in a game that was representative of things to come. Elsewhere, the Duluth Kelleys beat the Minneapolis Marines 3-0, the Akron Pros won in Rochester against the Jeffersons by a 3-0 score, and the Milwaukee Badgers hosted and defeated the Kansas City Blues by the score of — you guessed it — three to zero. It was the only time in NFL history that four games all finished with the same score on the same day. [continue reading…]

The New England Patriots, New York Giants, New York Giants and Philadelphia Eagles are undeniably in the northeast. I think most would include the Buffalo Bills are as well, although they do play in western New York. The state of Pennsylvania is commonly included in the northeast, but I don’t think it’s reasonable to include Pittsburgh, on the western border, in as a team in the northeast. The Baltimore Ravens are only 100 miles away from Philadelphia, but they are also only 40 miles from Washington, D.C., and no sensible definition of “Northeast” should include the nation’s capital.

So I’m going to stick with the NE-NYG-NYJ-PHI-BUF pairing as the definition of Northeast football. And only two years ago, it looked really bad: [continue reading…]

From 2002 to 2021, NFL teams converted 38.9% of all third down attempts. Third down performance is really meaningful when it comes to winning games, but it can also be pretty random from sample to sample. So as a result, third down performance has an outsized performance on who wins and loses that game, but is probably not all that predictable as to who will win the next game.

I thought it would be interesting to look at this in the context of the pre-game point spread. Let’s start with a few basic numbers, looking at this 20-year period.

• Teams that were favored by 1 to 5.5 points won 58.7% of their games.
• Teams that were favored by 6 to 8 points won 73.6% of their games.
• Teams that were favored by more than 8 points won 83.4% of their games.

But let’s say you know that the favorite would lose the third down battle. How does that change things?

• Teams that were favored by 1 to 5.5 points but were worse on third downs won only 43.4% of their games.
• Teams that were favored by 6 to 8 points but were worse on third downs won only 54.2% of their games.
• Teams that were favored by more than 8 points but were worse on third downs won 68.2% of their games.

Now, saying an underdog just needs to win the third down battle is not very helpful, and only a little more precise (and about as useless) as saying they just need to score more points. But it does help to provide some guardrails about the magnitude of third down performance. It can flip a big favorite into a coin flip, and a huge favorite suddenly has a real chance of losing.

Can we quantify exactly how important third down success is? I’m glad you asked. As we know, each team has a 38.9% chance of converting an average third down. Suppose each team has 15 third down attempts in the game. Let’s say one team coverts 10 of 15, while the other only converts five opportunities. The expected number of third down conversions for both teams is 5.8 (0.389 multiplied by 15), so one team converted 4.2 more first downs than expected, while the other converted 0.8 fewer than expected. The net difference, of course, is five conversions — let’s call that the net third downs added. [continue reading…]

The Minnesota Vikings have played a lot of close games this season.  In fact, all but one of their games was decided by 8 or fewer points, and the average margin of victory — regardless of who won the game — has been just 5.15 points.

[continue reading…]

Every year, I publish a color-coded version of the NFL schedule the night it is released. Tonight is that night.

Download the Excel file here. [continue reading…]

It was just three years ago that the New York Jets decided they absolutely needed to trade into the top 3 of the 2018 NFL Draft. The decision was bad at the time and looks worse in hindsight: not only did New York whiff by drafting Sam Darnold, one of the biggest draft busts in recent history, but the Jets could have taken either Josh Allen or Lamar Jackson with the team’s original pick.

The package that New York sent to Indianapolis for the 3rd pick was massive: New York sent the 6th overall pick (Quenton Nelson), along with the 37th (Braden Smith) and 49th (Dallas Goedert) picks, plus a 2019 2nd round pick (34th overall, Rock Ya-Sin) for the rights to acquire whoever would be there at three. The Jets got “lucky” in that Darnold, for much of the pre-draft process considered the presumptive first overall pick, was even available to them at three. As I wrote at the time, the Jets chose the rights to the third quarterback ^[1]Which, after the Giants drafted Saquon Barkley, turned into the second available quarterback. available in the draft over getting Lamar Jackson plus four second round picks. It has worked out to such a poor degree that the Jets are one month away from using the #2 overall pick that the Darnold-led Jets very much earned on Darnold’s successor.

Well, the 49ers decided what was bad for the Jets would be good for them. Because San Francisco decided to acquire Miami’s 3rd overall pick in the 2021 NFL Draft — ostensibly the right to select the third quarterback in the draft after the Jaguars and Jets have their picks — for a similarly enormous haul. San Francisco sent the 12th overall selection, along with its 1st and 3rd round picks in 2022, and its first round pick in 2023 in exchange for that third overall selection.

Can we calculate just how much the 49ers overpaid for the rights to the third pick? Under my draft value chart, the 3rd pick is worth 27.6 points while the 12th pick is worth 18.8 points; of course, those are just average values, and the 49ers feel like the dropoff in quality between a quarterback available at 3 and a quarterback available at 12 is enormous.

Let’s assume that the 49ers two first round picks will be average; pick 16 is valued at 16.9 points. If we assume a 10% discount rate on future picks for each season, that puts those two picks at 15.2 and 13.5 points, respectively. The 49ers are also sending a 2022 3rd round pick which is a comp pick (in this case, compensation for the Jets hiring Robert Saleh as head coach); that pick should be right around pick 100, worth 5.3 points. Apply a 10% discount, and we get 4.8 points.

So the 49ers gave up draft picks worth 18.8, 15.2, 13.5, and 4.8 points, for a total of 52.3 points. That is, obviously, a significant package, equivalent to the first overall pick in the draft plus another top-15 pick. To move up from 12 to 3, the 49ers gave up more than the Jets did when they moved up from 6 to 3; the Jets overall sent more total value to draft Darnold than San Francisco did to draft QB3 this year, but overall, the teams are pretty similar: [continue reading…]

The 2020 Atlanta Falcons starting offensive linemen were all former first round picks. Atlanta drafted right guard Chris Lindstrom and right tackle Kaleb McGary in the first round of the 2019 Draft, five years after using the 6th overall pick on Texas A&M left tackle Jake Matthews. In 2016, Atlanta signed center Alex Mack, the 21st pick in the 2009 Draft, away from the Browns to a monster deal; he’s been the center of the team’s offensive line ever since. And in the 2019 offseason, the left guard spot was pugged by James Carpenter, who had been a first round pick out of Alabama and then played four seasons each with the Seahawks and Jets.

It should go without saying that that is a lot of highly drafted offensive linemen for one team, even if Atlanta only drafted three of the players. ^[1]The Falcons also had five first round picks on offense outside of the offensive line: the Falcons drafted QB Matt Ryan, WR Julio Jones, and WR Calvin Ridley in the first round, too, and added former … Continue reading Let’s compare them to the Green Bay Packers, who had arguably the best offensive line in the NFL and trotted out the following starting five:

• LT David Bakhtiari (4th round pick by the Packers in 2013)
• LG Elgton Jenkins (2nd round pick by the Packers in 2019)
• C Corey Linsley (5th round pick by the Packers in 2014)
• RG Lucas Patrick (undrafted free agent out of Duke signed by the Packers in 2017)
• RT Billy Turner (3rd round pick by the 2014 Dolphins, signed by Green Bay in the 2019 offseason)

The Packers had one of the least heralded group of offensive linemen in the league — at least from a draft perspective (in other news, the entire left side of the line made the Pro Bowl). How does that compare to the rest of the NFL? [continue reading…]

Adam Steele is back for another guest post. You can view all of Adam’s posts here. As always, we thank him for contributing.

With the 2020 NFL playoffs having just concluded, now seems like a great time to tackle a question I’ve had for years: How strongly does quarterback performance correlate with team success in the postseason?

First, we need to measure quarterback performance. I graded each playoff start on a 0-4 scale, with zero being terrible and four being dominant. I chose this because it matches the academic GPA scale we’re all familiar with. The grade is based on performance while adjusting for era, opponent, weather, and other contextual factors.

Now you may be wondering why I don’t just use stats to grade games. Well, for the tiny sample of a single game stats can be very misleading, especially given the opponent and weather extremes we tend to see in the playoffs. I also prefer a rough instrument for this study so parsing all games into five buckets is ideal.

I included all quarterbacks with six or more playoff starts, giving us a sample of 69 players and 745 graded games. We’ll look at individual quarterbacks later, but for now let’s evaluate the big picture: [continue reading…]

In 2020, Derrick Henry had a monster season, rushing for 2,027 yards. In an era where the game continues to shift more to passing every year, Henry’s effort was truly remarkable. It’s also interesting that Buffalo WR Stefon Diggs led the NFL with 1,535 receiving yards.

That made 2020 a bit unusual: in recent seasons, the player with the most receiving yards tends to have a higher number than the player with the most rushing yards. That’s a reversal of how things used to be. The graph below shows the NFL’s rushing and receiving king in each season, and how many rushing or receiving yards they gained. For non-16 game seasons, the numbers were pro-rated to a 16-game era. [continue reading…]

The Saints have been defined by Sean Payton and Drew Brees for 15 years. And because of that, we tend to think about the Saints as a team that won a Super Bowl — even if the New Orleans championship team was over a decade ago.

The current Saints team — with offensive stars like Alvin Kamara and Michael Thomas, and a host of talented defensive players (Demario Davis,  Cameron Jordan, Marcus Williams and Marshon Lattimore, among others) — has not tasted championship success despite a remarkable amount of regular season success. In fact, they haven’t even made the Super Bowl. And with Brees now retiring, it looks like the curtain will close on what is easily the best four-year run in New Orleans regular season history.

Over the last four years, New Orleans has the most wins of any team (49), scored the second-most points behind Kansas City, and allowed the fifth fewest points.

Such great regular season success often results in a championship or two, and almost always results in a Super Bowl appearance. The Saints have a 0.766 winning percentage over the last four seasons, making them just the 4th franchise in the Super Bowl era to have such a high level of regular season success without making it to a Super Bowl.

The Dallas Cowboys from 1966 to 1969 had a similar streak of disappointing endings. In ’66, Dallas went 10-3-1 with the best offense in football; they lost to the Lombardi Packers in the NFL title game, the first time such game was the precursor to the Super Bowl. In ’67, Dallas went 9-5 but lost to the Packers in the Ice Bowl, again on the doorstep of the Super Bowl. In 1968, Dallas went 12-2, beating the Browns easily in the regular season but losing to them in the playoffs.

Don Meredith had led Dallas to a 27-9-1 mark from ’66 to ’68, but was embarrassed by Cleveland in the ’68 postseason, going 3 for 9 for 42 yards with three interceptions before being benched. At 31 years old, Meredith retired after the season. Enter Craig Morton, who led the ’69 Cowboys to an 11-2-1 mark in 1969… before the team again saw their season end at the hands of the Browns. Four seasons, a 0.768 winning percentage, and no Super Bowl appearances. The next year, Morton (with some help from Roger Staubach) and Dallas went 10-4 and finally reached it to the title game… before losing to the Colts. The year after, in 1971, Staubach helped Dallas finally reach the mountain top, winning Super Bowl VI.

The Oakland Raiders had a similar rough stretch from ’72 to ’75. In 1972, under Daryle Lamonica, the Raiders went 10-3-1 and ended the year on a 6-game winning streak. In the playoffs, it took the Immaculate Reception to defeat Oakland. In 1973, Ken Stabler became the starter, and while the Raiders would go 9-4-1 and avenge the playoff loss to Pittsburgh in the ’73 postseason, Oakland would still come up short against the defending Super Bowl champion Dolphins, who would repeat in ’73. In 1974 the Raiders went 12-2 and led the NFL in scoring; they would get their revenge against Miami in a memorable way in the playoffs, but once again were bested by the Steelers in the postseason. In 1975, Oakland had another great regular season that ended in a third straight loss in the AFC Championship Game, again to the Steelers. Over that 4-year run, the Raiders had a 0.768 winning percentage, but no Super Bowl appearances. Finally, in year five, Oakland would go 13-1, beat a depleted Steelers team in the playoffs, and then make — and win — their first Super Bowl.

The last franchise to discuss had a much longer run of frustration and did not ever result in redemption. The Los Angeles Rams from ’73 to ’76 had a 0.795 winning percentage, while the ’75 to ’78 squads went won 76.7% of their games. The ’67 to ’70 Rams also qualify with a 0.768 winning percentage during that four year run. Guard Tom Mack was on the Rams from ’66 to ’78; Merlin Olsen was a Ram from ’62 to ’77, so let’s call these the Mack/Olsen Rams.

Let’s look at the Rams from ’66, when Roman Gabriel took over as the starting quarterback, through the end of the ’70s. There was a constant shuffling of coaches and quarterbacks during the Mack/Olsen era,

The ’75 to ’78 Rams won 77% of their games and lost in the NFC Championship Game three times. From ’67 to ’70, Los Angeles twice missed the playoffs despite strong seasons, and twice lost in the division round to the eventual NFC Champion. But the period from ’73 to ’76 takes the cake: L.A. went 44-11-1 in the regular season but never made it to the Super Bowl. Minnesota went 45-10 and made it to three Super Bowls during this window, with Dallas (who beat the Rams in the playoffs in ’75) earning the other NFC appearance.

And then we have the Saints. New Orleans has won 11, 13, 13, and 12 games over the last four seasons. The 2017 season ended with the Minnesota Miracle; in 2018, the Saints earned the #1 seed but lost to the Rams in the NFC Championship Game, with a key defensive pass interference by Rams cornerback Nickell Robey-Coleman going uncalled. In 2019, New Orleans went 13-3 in the rare year where that landed them the three seed. That bad luck continued, with wildcard Minnesota once again upsetting the Saints and ending their season. And finally, in 2020, the Saints swept the Bucs in the regular season and earned the #2 seed in the NFC, but lost the third game against Tampa Bay in the Division Round.

The 2018 Draft Class was hailed as one of the best of all time. Where do things stand after three years? At a high level, it looks like there are three winners and two losers — after all, three of those quarterbacks will be starting games this weekend in the division round of the playoffs, while the other two were huge busts for their drafting team. But let’s dig a little deeper:

• Baker Mayfield was the first overall pick and has had an up-and-down run with Cleveland. Overall, he’s done enough to show that he deserves to keep the starting job, but he has not had a top-10 quarterback season since entering the league. Probably a bit below the expectations that come with the number one overall pick, but Cleveland fans are not unhappy.
• Sam Darnold was the third overall draft pick, selected by the New York Jets. It has not gone well.
• Josh Allen was the 7th overall pick and is probably the toughest player to evaluate. He was awful as a rookie, bad as a second-year player, and then played like a top-5 quarterback in 2020. He looks like a big win for Buffalo, and he adds a lot of value as a runner; that said, as a passer, he’s actually been below average over the course of his three seasons.
• Josh Rosen has been the clear worst quarterback of the group, and his team moved on from him after just one year. Rosen has been worse than Darnold on a per play basis, but given that Arizona replaced him with Kyler Murray, you could argue that the Cardinals were hurt less by the Rosen pick than the Jets were with Darnold. Rosen has been a fast burn, like a Johnny Manziel, while Darnold more fits the Joey Harrington or Rick Mirer slow burn mold.
• Lamar Jackson is the quarterback least capable of being evaluated solely as a passer, because he’s been the most dynamic runner in the NFL since he entered the league. Still, he’s been a very good passer through three seasons, and has clearly been the most productive quarterback through three years.

The graph below shows all quarterbacks drafted over a 50-year period, from 1969 to 2018. The Y-Axis shows how much passing value over average they produced — calculated by taking each quarterback’s Adjusted Net Yards per Attempt average relative to league average in each season, and multiplying that by the number of dropbacks. The X-Axis shows each player’s draft value, which is based on their draft selection. The more highly drafted players are on the left side of the chart, while the later picks are on the right side of the chart. For the 2018 1st round quarterbacks, I made their bubbles larger and color-coded them by team.

And here is the full dataset; the table is sortable and searchable.