It was just three years ago that the New York Jets decided they absolutely needed to trade into the top 3 of the 2018 NFL Draft. The decision was bad at the time and looks worse in hindsight: not only did New York whiff by drafting Sam Darnold, one of the biggest draft busts in recent history, but the Jets could have taken either Josh Allen or Lamar Jackson with the team’s original pick.

The package that New York sent to Indianapolis for the 3rd pick was massive: New York sent the 6th overall pick (Quenton Nelson), along with the 37th (Braden Smith) and 49th (Dallas Goedert) picks, plus a 2019 2nd round pick (34th overall, Rock Ya-Sin) for the rights to acquire whoever would be there at three. The Jets got “lucky” in that Darnold, for much of the pre-draft process considered the presumptive first overall pick, was even available to them at three. As I wrote at the time, the Jets chose the rights to the third quarterback ^[1]Which, after the Giants drafted Saquon Barkley, turned into the second available quarterback. available in the draft over getting Lamar Jackson plus four second round picks. It has worked out to such a poor degree that the Jets are one month away from using the #2 overall pick that the Darnold-led Jets very much earned on Darnold’s successor.

Well, the 49ers decided what was bad for the Jets would be good for them. Because San Francisco decided to acquire Miami’s 3rd overall pick in the 2021 NFL Draft — ostensibly the right to select the third quarterback in the draft after the Jaguars and Jets have their picks — for a similarly enormous haul. San Francisco sent the 12th overall selection, along with its 1st and 3rd round picks in 2022, and its first round pick in 2023 in exchange for that third overall selection.

Can we calculate just how much the 49ers overpaid for the rights to the third pick? Under my draft value chart, the 3rd pick is worth 27.6 points while the 12th pick is worth 18.8 points; of course, those are just average values, and the 49ers feel like the dropoff in quality between a quarterback available at 3 and a quarterback available at 12 is enormous.

Let’s assume that the 49ers two first round picks will be average; pick 16 is valued at 16.9 points. If we assume a 10% discount rate on future picks for each season, that puts those two picks at 15.2 and 13.5 points, respectively. The 49ers are also sending a 2022 3rd round pick which is a comp pick (in this case, compensation for the Jets hiring Robert Saleh as head coach); that pick should be right around pick 100, worth 5.3 points. Apply a 10% discount, and we get 4.8 points.

So the 49ers gave up draft picks worth 18.8, 15.2, 13.5, and 4.8 points, for a total of 52.3 points. That is, obviously, a significant package, equivalent to the first overall pick in the draft plus another top-15 pick. To move up from 12 to 3, the 49ers gave up more than the Jets did when they moved up from 6 to 3; the Jets overall sent more total value to draft Darnold than San Francisco did to draft QB3 this year, but overall, the teams are pretty similar:

If we look at the traditional chart used for trades, the huge haul only looks slightly less severe. The 3rd overall pick is worth 2200 points, while the 12th pick is worth 1200 points. The 16th pick is worth 1,000 points; if we use a 10% discount, the two future first round picks are worth 900 and 800 points, respectively. The 100th pick is worth 100 points, or 90 points given that it is a year away. That totals 1790 points to trade up from 12 to 3, or equivalent to the 4th overall pick.

Given that the 49ers are doing this knowing that they will get only the third best quarterback in the Draft is particularly egregious. ^[2]Of course, it’s possible that they wind up getting *their* number one or number two quarterback, but the odds are very high that the Jaguars and Jets will both be drafting quarterbacks. San Francisco’s offense is not barren; George Kittle, Brandon Aiyuk, and Trent Williams are strong building blocks. One issue the Jets had was an inability to surround Darnold with even average NFL players on offense; that, at least in the short term, may not be an issue for the 49ers.  But any trade like this necessarily hampers the ability of the team to bolster the offense through the draft, which makes it harder for a rookie quarterback to succeed. If the 49ers hit on the right quarterback, the team could be in a position to win immediately. But if San Francisco misses, the team is headed for a sustained period of disappointment, with poor quarterback play and three wasted first round picks. The biggest concern is that if the team chooses the wrong quarterback, San Francisco could be giving up a very valuable first round picks in ’22 and/or ’23 — much higher than 16 —  and won’t have a great opportunity to fix the quarterback situation until 2024.

This wasn’t quite the trade-up for RG3 or Jared Goff, but it was significant. San Francisco gave up 52.3 points to draft QB3, nearly identical to when the Eagles gave up 52.6 points of value to get QB2 — which turned out to be Carson Wentz. The Jets/Darnold trade is an obvious red flag to this sort of deal, and San Francisco clearly gave up more value than they received; the only way this trade works is if the 49ers land a top-15 (at worst) quarterback.

From San Francisco’s perspective, they are clearly chasing tail value; yes, on average these trades are bad, but sometimes it’s a win, and sometimes it’s a really big win. Maybe they are getting Jim Kelly or Ben Roethlisberger or Deshaun Watson, the third quarterbacks taken in strong quarterback drafts, as opposed to Blaine Gabbert, Akili Smith, Dwayne Haskins, or Dan Pastrorini. What’s interesting is that no team in the NFL has a better understanding of how to get “decent” quarterback play for cheap than San Francisco. Over the last three years, Nick Mullens ranks 24th out of 37 qualifying quarterbacks in Adjusted Net Yards per Attempt; Sam Darnold, for reference, ranks 37th. Mullens was an undrafted free agent, and San Francisco could have chosen to bring him back as the team’s starter in 2021. The 49ers also still have Jimmy Garoppolo under contract, albeit a very expensive one.

This reminds me of an old Doug Drinen adage: the ultimate “analytics” team would spend about 60% of the salary cap and go 9-7. That might be the most efficient use of team resources, at least on a wins-to-dollars ratio. But the ultimate goal is to win the Super Bowl, of course. And presumably the 49ers feel that if they want to win the Super Bowl, they need to pay a large premium to move up from Mullens/Garoppolo to whomever the third pick in the 2021 Draft will be.